The US defense industrial base depends on a supply chain of mined materials that the country largely imports. According to the US Geological Survey (USGS), the United States is 100% import-reliant for at least 12 critical minerals and more than 50% reliant on imports for an additional 28 [1]. China is the primary supplier for 24 of the minerals deemed critical to the US and dominates downstream processing for the majority of them [2].
This dependency has become a central focus of federal policy. In March 2025, Executive Order 14241, titled Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production, designated critical mineral production as a priority industrial capability for the Department of Defense's Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) Program [3]. The order invoked the Defense Production Act (DPA), delegated Title III investment authority to multiple agencies, and directed the creation of a dedicated mineral investment fund [3][4].
This page provides a factual overview of how federal defense policy intersects with critical mineral supply chains. Lion Rock Resources (TSXV: ROAR, OTCQB: LRRIF, FSE: KGB) is advancing the Volney Project in the Tinton Pegmatite District of South Dakota's Black Hills, where Phase 1 drilling confirmed the presence of multiple critical minerals, including lithium, tin, and tantalum. All three appear on the USGS 2025 List of Critical Minerals [5].
Critical minerals are classified as such under the Energy Act of 2020 because they are both essential to the US economy or national security and have supply chains vulnerable to disruption [5]. The defense dimension of this classification is straightforward: the industrial base that produces advanced technology systems, from semiconductors to communications infrastructure to aerospace components, requires mined inputs that the US does not produce in sufficient quantities domestically.
The USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 documented that the US was the world's largest importer of metal ores and concentrates, while China was the largest importer at 64% of global trade by value in 2023 [6]. This means that even when minerals are mined in allied nations, they frequently transit through Chinese processing facilities before reaching US manufacturers.
China's willingness to restrict mineral exports has made this dependency operational rather than theoretical. Since 2023, China has imposed escalating export controls on minerals used across industrial supply chains, culminating in outright bans on exports of gallium, germanium, and antimony to the United States in December 2024 [7]. The Council on Foreign Relations described this as a pattern in which China has used its mineral dominance as a core feature of foreign policy [8].
The Defense Production Act (DPA), originally enacted in 1950 and periodically reauthorized by Congress, provides the federal government with authorities to strengthen the domestic industrial base. Title III of the DPA is specifically an investment authority designed to expand domestic production capacity where commercial markets are unlikely to meet national defense needs on their own [9].
Title III funding can take several forms: loans, loan guarantees, direct capital investments, purchase commitments, and equity positions in companies [4][9]. Funded businesses can pursue commercial (non-defense) customers, but defense needs are given contractual priority [9].
In March 2025, Executive Order 14241 expanded DPA Title III authorities by reducing approval requirements and delegating investment authority to both the Department of Defense and the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) [3][4]. The order directed these agencies to create a joint mineral investment fund and instructed the Secretary of Defense to prioritize mineral production within the IBAS Program.
Since mid-2023, the Department of Defense has used DPA Title III authority to award over $250 million to twelve recipients for domestic critical mineral production, utilizing funds appropriated by the Inflation Reduction Act [10]. These awards have supported lithium mining, rare earth separation, tantalum processing, battery manufacturing, and workforce development [10].
Eligible countries for Title III support include the US, Canada, and (as of the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act) Australia [9]. The Congressional Research Service has described DPA Title III as the existing statute best suited to rebuilding domestic mining and refining capacity [9].
The scale of federal investment has increased substantially since 2025. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (P.L. 119-21), signed into law on July 4, 2025, provided the Department of Defense with the following appropriations for critical mineral supply chains [4]:
$2 billion for the National Defense Stockpile (NDSTF) to purchase critical minerals.
$5 billion for the Industrial Base Fund (IBF) to support critical mineral supply chains, with authority for the Department to take equity positions in companies.
$1 billion for Defense Production Act financing through September 2027.
$500 million for the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) to provide loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance to critical mineral industries.
Individual investments executed under these authorities include a $400 million equity investment in MP Materials for rare earth processing and a $150 million OSC loan for heavy rare earth separation in California (July 2025), a $35.6 million investment in Trilogy Metals for mineral development in Alaska (October 2025), and a $1.4 billion public-private partnership with Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies (November 2025) [4].
The Defense Industrial Base Consortium (DIBC) has also issued requests for project proposals targeting specific defense-critical minerals. A February 2026 solicitation sought proposals covering thirteen minerals across the full value chain, from raw mineral sourcing and beneficiation through processing, refining, and recycling [11]. The solicitation indicated potential funding ranging from approximately $100 million to more than $500 million per project [11].
The National Defense Stockpile (NDS), created by statute in 1939, is a federal reserve of materials maintained for use during national emergencies. It is managed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) [12].
In 2025, the Department of Defense announced its intent to procure up to $1 billion in stockpile materials. The DLA issued multiple requests for information covering minerals including tungsten, graphite, scandium, and rare earth elements [12]. In some cases, the quantities requested in RFIs approached or exceeded total annual US consumption levels for the minerals in question [12].
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act's $2 billion appropriation for the NDSTF represents the largest single infusion of stockpile funding in decades. DLA leadership has indicated that the agency will invest in advanced data analytics to improve demand forecasting and risk mitigation for critical mineral supply chains [12].
Tantalum, tin, and lithium each play documented roles in the broader industrial base:
Tantalum: Tantalum capacitors are used extensively in electronics across aerospace, communications, and computing applications. Their high reliability, thermal stability, and ability to operate in harsh environments make them a standard component in high-performance electronic systems [13]. The US has been 100% import-reliant for tantalum for at least five consecutive years. Tantalum has not been mined domestically since 1959 [14]. A September 2024 US Trade Representative action imposed 25% tariffs on Chinese tantalum imports [15].
Tin: Tin-based solder is the standard material for connecting components on circuit boards across virtually all electronics manufacturing, including the systems that form the backbone of communications and computing infrastructure [16]. The US imports approximately 73% of its tin supply, with no primary domestic mining currently in operation [17].
Lithium: Lithium-ion batteries are the primary energy storage technology for portable electronics, backup power systems, and an increasing range of mobile and stationary applications. DPA Title III awards have included direct funding for domestic lithium production, including a $90 million award to Albemarle for the Kings Mountain, North Carolina lithium mine and an $11.81 million award to Lithium Nevada Corporation [10].
These minerals are part of a broader category of materials that federal policy is working to secure through domestic production, allied sourcing, and stockpiling. Lion Rock Resources makes no claim that any government program, incentive, or policy will apply to or benefit the Company or the Volney Project.
Federal policy on defense-related mineral supply chains is moving in several directions simultaneously:
Domestic production: Executive Order 14241 and the One Big Beautiful Bill Act have provided both the authority and funding to invest directly in domestic mining and processing projects [11].
Allied sourcing: DPA Title III eligibility has been extended to Australia, alongside longstanding eligibility for Canada. Policy discussions have included potential expansion to additional allied nations [9]. The US-EU 2025 critical minerals coordination plan under the Minerals Security Partnership framework includes aligned procurement and subsidy frameworks [4].
Stockpiling: The $2 billion NDSTF appropriation and the Department of Defense's $1 billion procurement target signal a return to active strategic stockpiling after decades of drawdowns [12].
Processing and refining: Federal investments are increasingly targeting downstream processing capacity, not just raw material extraction. The MP Materials partnership, the Vulcan Elements deal, and multiple DOE awards for rare earth separation all focus on building the refining infrastructure needed to convert raw material into usable industrial inputs [4].
What is the Defense Production Act Title III?
DPA Title III is a federal investment authority that allows the government to expand domestic production capacity for materials deemed essential to national defense. Funding can take the form of loans, loan guarantees, direct capital investments, purchase commitments, or equity positions. It is the primary statutory tool used to support domestic critical mineral production [9][10].
How much has the US government invested in defense-related critical mineral supply chains?
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (July 2025) appropriated over $8.5 billion across the National Defense Stockpile ($2B), Industrial Base Fund ($5B), DPA financing ($1B), and Office of Strategic Capital ($500M). Additional investments have been executed through DPA Title III awards, OSC loans, and equity positions in individual companies [4][10].
Is tantalum used in defense applications?
Yes. Tantalum capacitors are a standard component in high-reliability electronics used across aerospace, communications, and computing applications. The US is 100% import-reliant for tantalum, with no domestic mining since 1959 [13][14].
What critical minerals are found at the Volney Project?
Drilling at Lion Rock’s Volney project has confirmed the presence of a critical mineral system, including lithium, tin, and tantalum. The project is a past producer of all three minerals and has the potential for rapid advancement back into production. All three appear on the USGS 2025 List of Critical Minerals. Reported intervals are downhole lengths; true widths are unknown, and grades are uncut. Carl Ginn, P.Geo., is the Qualified Person for the Volney Project under NI 43-101.
[1] US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025. https://www.usgs.gov/publications/mineral-commodity-summaries-2025
[2] Metal Tech News, US Critical Mineral Reliance Unchanged, February 2025 (citing USGS data). https://www.metaltechnews.com/story/2025/02/05/tech-metals/us-critical-mineral-reliance-unchanged/2125.html
[3] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Unpacking Trump's New Critical Minerals Executive Order, March 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-trumps-new-critical-minerals-executive-order
[4] Brownstein, US Expands Critical Minerals Financing and Bilateral Partnerships Under Trump, November 2025. https://www.bhfs.com/insight/u-s-expands-critical-minerals-financing-and-bilateral-partnerships-under-trump/
[5] US Geological Survey, 2025 List of Critical Minerals, finalized November 7, 2025. https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/2025-list-critical-minerals
[6] US Geological Survey, Fact Sheet 2025-3038, Global Maps of Critical Mineral Production in 2023. https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/fs20253038/full
[7] Global Trade Alert, A Widening Net: A Short History of Chinese Export Controls on Critical Raw Materials, October 2025. https://globaltradealert.org/blog/a-short-history-of-chinese-export-controls-on-critical-raw-materials
[8] Council on Foreign Relations, Leapfrogging China's Critical Minerals Dominance, February 2026. https://www.cfr.org/reports/leapfrogging-chinas-critical-minerals-dominance
[9] American Compass, Restoring Leadership in Critical Minerals, March 2025. https://americancompass.org/restoring-leadership-in-critical-minerals/
[10] US Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, Summary of DPAP Awards Funded via Inflation Reduction Act, November 2024. https://www.acq.osd.mil/news/office-news/asda/2024/Summary-of-DPAP-Awards-Funded-via-Inflation-Reduction-Act.html
[11] Inside Government Contracts, Defense Industrial Base Consortium Issues New Critical Minerals Request for Project Proposals, March 2026. https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2026/03/defense-industrial-base-consortium-issues-new-critical-minerals-request-for-project-proposals/
[12] Inside Government Contracts, Federal Push for Critical Minerals Stockpiling: 2025 in Review and Outlook for 2026, February 2026. https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2026/02/federal-push-for-critical-minerals-stockpiling-2025-in-review-and-outlook-for-2026/
[13] SFA Oxford, Critical Minerals in Servers and Data Storage. https://www.sfa-oxford.com/knowledge-and-insights/critical-minerals-in-low-carbon-and-future-technologies/critical-minerals-in-electronics/critical-minerals-in-servers-and-data-storage/
[14] US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, Tantalum. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-tantalum.pdf?v=060205
[15] Mordor Intelligence, Tantalum Capacitors Market Size and Share Outlook to 2030 (citing September 2024 US tariff action). https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/tantalum-capacitors-market
[16] Crux Investor, Tin Market Rebounds on Tightening Supply and AI-Led Demand Signals, November 2025. https://www.cruxinvestor.com/posts/tin-market-rebounds-on-tightening-supply-ai-led-demand-signals
[17] US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, Tin. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-tin.pdf?v=060205
Critical Minerals and the China Supply Chain
Critical Minerals and AI Infrastructure
Tantalum Exploration in the United States
Tin Exploration in North America
Lithium Exploration in the Black Hills
Gold Discovery at the Volney Project
Disclaimer: This page is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, a solicitation, or an offer to buy or sell securities. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties. Mineral exploration is speculative and may not result in the discovery of an economic deposit. There is no assurance that any government program, incentive, or policy described on this page will apply to or benefit Lion Rock Resources or the Volney Project. Lion Rock Resources is not a defense contractor and makes no claim of participation in any defense procurement program. Readers should consult their own financial advisors and review the Company's public filings on SEDAR+ before making any decisions.
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