The global supply chain for critical minerals runs disproportionately through China at nearly every stage, from mining to refining to finished component manufacturing. The United States is 100% import-reliant for at least 12 critical minerals and more than 50% reliant on imports for an additional 28, according to the US Geological Survey (USGS) Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 [1]. This concentration creates structural vulnerability across the defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors.
The challenge is not limited to any single stage of the supply chain. China leads in both extraction and processing for many minerals, and since 2023 has demonstrated a willingness to restrict exports as a geopolitical tool. The US federal response has targeted the full supply chain: funding domestic mining, building new processing and refining capacity, and stockpiling finished materials. Rebuilding each link in that chain requires both raw material feedstock and the downstream infrastructure to process it.
Lion Rock Resources (TSXV: ROAR, OTCQB: LRRIF, FSE: KGB) is advancing the Volney Project in the Tinton Pegmatite District of South Dakota's Black Hills, where drilling has confirmed the presence of a critical mineral system, including lithium, tin, and tantalum. The project is a past producer of all three minerals and has the potential for rapid advancement back into production. All three appear on the USGS 2025 List of Critical Minerals [2]. The Volney Project is located on private land, with road access and proximity to existing infrastructure, in one of the most established mining jurisdictions in the United States.
China's position in critical minerals is not just about refining. It spans the full supply chain, from mine to magnet.
At the mining stage, China was the leading producer of 18 mineral commodities (at 5% or more of global output) in 2023, more than any other country, according to a 2025 USGS fact sheet [3]. China mines approximately 69% of the world's rare earth elements, 83% of tungsten, and 23% of global tin [1][3].
At the processing and refining stage, concentration intensifies. The International Energy Agency's (IEA) Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 found that China is the dominant refiner for 19 of 20 minerals analyzed, with an average processing market share of approximately 70% [4]. USGS data shows how dramatically China's share increases from mine to refinery for individual minerals: cobalt goes from 1% mining share to 80% processing share; tin from 23% to 50%; aluminum from 21% to 59% [3].
At the component manufacturing stage, the concentration continues. China now accounts for approximately 94% of global production of sintered rare earth permanent magnets, up from roughly 50% two decades ago, according to the IEA [5]. These magnets are essential components in electric vehicle motors, wind turbines, industrial motors, and defense systems.
This full-chain dominance is the product of sustained, strategic investment. As the Council on Foreign Relations noted in a February 2026 report, China's mineral dominance was a stated goal of the 2015 Made in China 2025 plan, pursued over a decade of investments across the entire critical minerals ecosystem [6].
The implication is that supply chain risk exists at every level. Even if a mineral is mined outside China, it may still depend on Chinese processing capacity to reach a usable form. And even if processing moves elsewhere, component manufacturing remains heavily concentrated. Addressing the vulnerability requires rebuilding capacity across all three stages.
Since mid-2023, China has implemented a series of escalating export controls on critical minerals, demonstrating both the reach and precision of its supply chain leverage. The timeline of major actions includes [7][8][9]:
July 2023: Export licensing requirements imposed on gallium and germanium, effective August 1, 2023.
October 2023: Export permit requirements announced for three categories of graphite products, effective December 2023.
December 2023: Ban on the export of technology for rare earth extraction, separation, and smelting.
August 2024: Export limits imposed on antimony, used in ammunition and infrared sensors. Chinese antimony exports subsequently fell by approximately 97%.
December 2024: Outright ban on exports of gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials to the United States.
February 2025: Export controls extended to tungsten and tellurium.
April 2025: Seven medium and heavy rare earth elements added to the dual-use export control list.
October 2025: Controls expanded to five additional rare earth elements, rare earth processing equipment, lithium battery supply chain materials, and synthetic graphite. For the first time, China asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign-made products containing Chinese-origin rare earth materials.
The October 2025 measures marked a qualitative shift. The IEA noted that in 2024, China exported 58,000 tonnes of rare earth magnets, enough to manufacture components for millions of vehicles, industrial motors, or defense systems [5]. If fully implemented, the new controls would extend Chinese licensing authority over products manufactured outside China using Chinese-origin inputs, effectively reaching into allied nations' manufacturing supply chains.
According to the USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025, the US was 100% import-reliant for 12 minerals on the 2022 Critical Minerals List in 2024, unchanged from the prior year [1]. The number of critical minerals where the US is more than 50% reliant on imports was 28 [10].
For the minerals present at the Volney Project:
Tantalum: The US has been 100% import-reliant for tantalum for at least five consecutive years. Tantalum has not been mined in the United States since 1959. China supplies approximately 24% of total US tantalum imports, with 42% of tantalum metal and powder specifically sourced from China. US tantalum apparent consumption was estimated at 890 tons in 2025, a 58% increase from 2024, driven by demand from consumer electronics and data centers [11][12].
Tin: The US imports approximately 73% of its tin supply. No primary tin mining currently operates in the United States, though one US company with operations in Pennsylvania received $19 million from the US Department of Defense in late 2024 to advance a vertically integrated domestic tin supply chain [13][14].
Lithium: Australia currently leads global lithium output with approximately 36.7% of world production. China dominates lithium processing, handling approximately 80% of global refining capacity. Lithium demand rose by nearly 30% in 2024, according to the IEA [4][15].
The federal response has targeted all three stages of the supply chain: mining, processing, and stockpiling.
Mining and exploration: The USGS has invested $57 million in exploration across 39 states through its Earth Mapping Resources Initiative (Earth MRI) to locate domestic deposits that could reduce import reliance [10]. The DOE announced $80 million for the Mine of the Future proving grounds initiative to test next-generation mining technologies in real-world conditions [16].
Processing and refining: In July 2025, the Department of Defense executed a $400 million equity investment in MP Materials and issued a $150 million loan to support heavy rare earth separation capacity in California, representing the first time the federal government became a major shareholder in a critical minerals company [17]. The DOE announced $134 million in December 2025 to enhance domestic rare earth element recovery and refining from unconventional feedstocks [18]. An additional $275 million was announced for by-product mineral recovery at domestic industrial facilities [16].
Stockpiling and legislative action: The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed in July 2025, appropriated $2 billion for the National Defense Stockpile to purchase critical minerals, $5 billion to the Industrial Base Fund for critical mineral supply chains, $1 billion for Defense Production Act financing through September 2027, and $500 million for the Office of Strategic Capital [19]. In 2025, the Department of Defense announced its intent to procure up to $1 billion in stockpile materials [20].
The 2025 USGS List of Critical Minerals expanded from 50 to 60 minerals, adding copper, silver, lead, uranium, and six others. Lithium, tin, and tantalum remain on the list [2].
A reasonable question about any domestic mining project is whether it addresses the supply chain problem if refining capacity remains concentrated overseas. The federal strategy addresses this directly: the US is investing in processing and refining capacity at the same time as it supports domestic mining. The MP Materials partnership, the DOE's $134 million for rare earth recovery and refining, and the $275 million for by-product mineral processing at domestic industrial facilities are all aimed at building the downstream infrastructure that converts raw material into usable products.
Domestic feedstock is a prerequisite for domestic processing. A refinery requires a supply of raw material. As federal processing capacity comes online, domestically mined material becomes an input that does not depend on foreign supply chains at any stage. The Council on Foreign Relations noted in February 2026 that the US cannot rely solely on expanding traditional mining, but that mining remains a necessary component of a broader strategy that includes processing, recycling, and innovation [6].
The Volney Project's Phase 1 drilling returned results across multiple critical minerals in the Black Hills of South Dakota, a region with over a century of documented mining history. The project is located on private land with road access and proximity to existing infrastructure.
Cautionary note: Lion Rock Resources is a junior mineral exploration company. The Volney Project is at an early exploration stage. Mineral exploration is inherently risky and there is no guarantee that additional exploration will result in the discovery of an economic mineral deposit. There is no assurance that any government program, incentive, or policy will apply to or benefit the Company or the Volney Project. Readers should review the Company's public filings on SEDAR+ for complete risk disclosures.
How many critical minerals does China dominate?
China is the dominant refiner for 19 of 20 critical minerals analyzed by the IEA, with an average processing market share of approximately 70% [4]. China is also the leading mining country for 18 mineral commodities at 5% or more of global production [3]. Its position extends into component manufacturing, with approximately 94% of sintered rare earth permanent magnet production [5].
Is the US 100% import-reliant for tantalum?
Yes. According to the USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, the US has been 100% import-reliant for tantalum for at least five consecutive years. Tantalum has not been mined domestically since 1959 [12].
What critical minerals are found at the Volney Project?
Phase 1 drilling at the Volney Project confirmed the presence of multiple critical minerals, including lithium, tin, and tantalum. All three appear on the USGS 2025 List of Critical Minerals. Reported intervals are downhole lengths; true widths are unknown, and grades are uncut. Carl Ginn, P.Geo., is the Qualified Person for the Volney Project under NI 43-101.
Has China banned critical mineral exports to the US?
In December 2024, China issued an outright ban on exports of gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials to the United States. Broader export licensing requirements have been imposed on graphite, tungsten, tellurium, and multiple rare earth elements since 2023 [7][8][9].
Is the US building domestic processing capacity for critical minerals?
Yes. Federal investments include the Department of Defense's $400 million equity investment in MP Materials for rare earth processing, DOE's $134 million for rare earth recovery and refining, $275 million for by-product mineral recovery at industrial facilities, and $80 million for the Mine of the Future proving grounds [16][17][18]. Legislative appropriations through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act total over $8.5 billion across stockpiling, the Industrial Base Fund, the Defense Production Act, and the Office of Strategic Capital [19].
[1] US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025. https://www.usgs.gov/publications/mineral-commodity-summaries-2025
[2] US Geological Survey, 2025 List of Critical Minerals, finalized November 7, 2025. https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/2025-list-critical-minerals
[3] US Geological Survey, Fact Sheet 2025-3038, Global Maps of Critical Mineral Production in 2023. https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/fs20253038/full
[4] International Energy Agency, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025, Executive Summary. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2025/executive-summary
[5] International Energy Agency, With New Export Controls on Critical Minerals, Supply Concentration Risks Become Reality, October 2025. https://www.iea.org/commentaries/with-new-export-controls-on-critical-minerals-supply-concentration-risks-become-reality
[6] Council on Foreign Relations, Leapfrogging China's Critical Minerals Dominance, February 2026. https://www.cfr.org/reports/leapfrogging-chinas-critical-minerals-dominance
[7] Andersen Institute, China's Export Controls: Critical Minerals and Strategic Pressure Points, May 2026. https://anderseninstitute.org/chinas-export-control-architecture-and-its-use-of-critical-minerals-as-strategic-pressure-points/
[8] Global Trade Alert, A Widening Net: A Short History of Chinese Export Controls on Critical Raw Materials and Their Usage, October 2025. https://globaltradealert.org/blog/a-short-history-of-chinese-export-controls-on-critical-raw-materials
[9] ORF America, China's Critical Mineral Export Controls: Background and Chokepoints, April 2025. https://orfamerica.org/newresearch/chinas-critical-mineral-export-controls
[10] Metal Tech News, US Critical Mineral Reliance Unchanged, February 2025. https://www.metaltechnews.com/story/2025/02/05/tech-metals/us-critical-mineral-reliance-unchanged/2125.html
[11] US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025, Tantalum. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2025/mcs2025-tantalum.pdf?v=060205
[12] US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, Tantalum. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-tantalum.pdf?v=060205
[13] US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, Tin. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-tin.pdf?v=060205
[14] Visual Capitalist, Charted: America's Reliance on Foreign Minerals, July 2025 (data from USGS). https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/charted-americas-reliance-on-foreign-minerals/
[15] Visual Capitalist, How Much Control China Has Over the World's Critical Minerals, October 2025 (data from White & Case LLP, December 2024). https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/how-much-control-china-has-over-the-worlds-critical-minerals/
[16] US Department of Energy, Energy Department Announces $355 Million to Expand Domestic Production of Critical Minerals and Materials, November 2025. https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-department-announces-355-million-expand-domestic-production-critical-minerals-and
[17] Bipartisan Policy Center, DOD Bets Big on Rare Earth Elements, October 2025. https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/dod-bets-big-on-rare-earth-elements/
[18] US Department of Energy, Energy Department Announces $134 Million in Funding to Strengthen Rare Earth Element Supply Chains, December 2025. https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-department-announces-134-million-funding-strengthen-rare-earth-element-supply
[19] Brownstein, US Expands Critical Minerals Financing and Bilateral Partnerships Under Trump, November 2025. https://www.bhfs.com/insight/u-s-expands-critical-minerals-financing-and-bilateral-partnerships-under-trump/
[20] Inside Government Contracts, Federal Push for Critical Minerals Stockpiling: 2025 in Review and Outlook for 2026, February 2026. https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2026/02/federal-push-for-critical-minerals-stockpiling-2025-in-review-and-outlook-for-2026/
Tantalum Exploration in the United States
Tin Exploration in North America
Lithium Exploration in the Black Hills
Gold Discovery at the Volney Project
Disclaimer: This page is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, a solicitation, or an offer to buy or sell securities. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties. Mineral exploration is speculative and may not result in the discovery of an economic deposit. There is no assurance that any government program, incentive, or policy described on this page will apply to or benefit Lion Rock Resources or the Volney Project. Readers should consult their own financial advisors and review the Company's public filings on SEDAR+ before making any decisions. Carl Ginn, P.Geo., is the Qualified Person as defined by NI 43-101 responsible for the technical content related to Lion Rock Resources on this page.
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Lion Rock Resources Inc.
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